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ESSAY
Calvin Massey: Gentleman and Scholar
ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT*
ABSTRACT
I first met Calvin Massey in person in 1994, when I joined the U.C.
Hastings faculty. However, I knew of and admired Calvin’s scholarship long
before that. Six years earlier, I was a law student at the University of
Chicago, and a student editor at the law review. In that role, I helped citecheck and edit a major article authored by Calvin, as well as a series of
short responses by Calvin and other scholars, debating the meaning and
scope of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. I was struck then,
and continue to be amazed, by the clarity, thoroughness, and intellectual
rigor of this exchange, and especially Calvin’s contributions to it. I truly
believe that these papers provide a model for what engaged, respectful, and
careful scholarly debate should look like. They certainly provided an
inspiration to me as I began my scholarly career, just as Calvin provided
crucial mentorship during my early years at Hastings. In this brief essay I
summarize this intellectual exchange, and explain why I think it epitomizes
Calvin’s extraordinary strengths as a scholar, and as a gentleman.
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INTRODUCTION

Over 22 years ago, in the summer of 1994, I joined the faculty at U.C.
Hastings College of the Law. I had essentially no scholarly or teaching
experience, and had to wear a suit every day to make sure everyone knew I
wasn’t a student. I had also just moved to California from the East Coast,
and my wife, Shannon, and I knew nobody. But that changed quickly. We
were warmly welcomed into the Hastings community by many, many people,
including many in this room today. I also quickly found scholarly mentors
who helped me find my voice, and provided models for what it meant to be a
rigorous, thoughtful, and engaged scholar. In all of these respects, no one
was more important to me than Calvin Massey.
Calvin’s warmth, kindness, and generosity are well-known to everyone
in this room. I still have strong memories of a dinner party to which Calvin
and Martha kindly invited Shannon and me during those early years, which
gave us an object lesson in what graceful hospitality looks like. But what I
want to talk about was Calvin’s role as a scholarly mentor. Because the thing
is, when I arrived at Hastings, I was already familiar with Calvin’s work.
Indeed, Calvin was the only member of the Hastings faculty whose
scholarship I had previously been exposed to (not because of a lack of great
scholars at Hastings, but because of my illiteracy), and an important factor
drawing me to Hastings was the knowledge that Calvin was on that faculty.
This is because although I’d never met him face-to-face, I also knew that the
best I could hope to accomplish in my career was to try to emulate Calvin’s
intellectual rigor.
I.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Six years before I arrived at Hastings, I was a second-year law student at
the University of Chicago, and a student editor at the University of Chicago
Law Review. That is when I was first exposed to Calvin the intellectual.
Early in that year, the Law Review published an article titled “State
Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments,” authored by (as
you’ve probably guessed) then-Associate Professor Calvin Massey of
Hastings.1 One of my first jobs on the Law Review was to help cite-check
that article—no small task as the article was 91 pages long and had over 400
footnotes! 2 But it was an intellectual tour de force. The subtlety and
thoroughness of Calvin’s historical analysis still strikes me as a model of
how to approach a difficult, even intractable problem, and make the best
possible case for your position, knowing that final resolution is impossible.
1

Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 61 n.† (1989).
2
Id. at 150–51.
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But the story does not end with Calvin’s first piece. Early the next
academic year, then-Professor (now Judge) William Fletcher published a
shorter piece in the Law Review, “replying to critics” of Fletcher’s position
on this particular constitutional dispute3—“critics” referring to Calvin, as
well as professors Lawrence Marshall (then at Northwestern, now at
Stanford) and William Marshall (then at Case Western, now at the University
of North Carolina), who had recently published articles on the same topic at
Harvard.4 To make matters worse, the articles all analyzed opinions by both
John Marshall and Thurgood Marshall, 5 creating a thorough-going
Marshallian confusion. I don’t recall if I worked on Fletcher’s article, but it
was and is very impressive.
And the story still doesn’t end. The year we published Judge Fletcher’s
piece, I was serving as one of the two Articles Editors at the Law Review.
Someone—I believe it was Calvin, though don’t quote me on that—came up
with the idea of continuing the ongoing dialogue I just described via short
letters. The result was a new (and unfortunately short-lived) section of the
Law Review titled “Correspondence,” in which we published letters by
Calvin and Professors Lawrence and William Marshall responding to
Fletcher, and a short rebuttal by Fletcher.6
I want to speak a little about the substance, and the style, of this scholarly
back-and-forth for two reasons. First of all, the topic remains very much
relevant and contested today. Second, I believe that Calvin’s role in this
debate illustrates everything that I so admired about Calvin as a scholar.
II.

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

The basic subjects of Calvin’s original article, and all the other
scholarship I just described, were the proper interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the related question of the
scope of the sovereign immunity enjoyed by state governments in our federal
system. The Eleventh Amendment reads:
3

William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989).
4
Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989); William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the
Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989).
5
See, e.g., Massey, supra note 1, at 121–22 (discussing United States v. Peters,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.); id. at 126–28 (discussing Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) and Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.); id. at 145–46 (discussing Employees. of
the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S.
279, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring).
6
Calvin R. Massey et al., Correspondence, Exchange on the Eleventh
Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 117 (1990).
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The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.7
It was adopted in 1795, and its main purpose was to overturn the Supreme
Court’s 1793 decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 8 which had permitted a
lawsuit for breach of contract brought by a South Carolinian against the State
of Georgia to proceed in federal court under the court’s diversity jurisdiction,
despite the State’s claim of sovereign immunity.9 The Eleventh Amendment
undoubtedly reversed that result. The open question is what else it did.
There is a longstanding scholarly and legal dispute about the meaning of
the Eleventh Amendment. The current position of the Supreme Court, which
was first developed in 1890 in Han v. Louisiana, 10 is that the Eleventh
Amendment merely meant to restate a preexisting understanding that the
States enjoyed sovereign immunity against lawsuits to which they do not
consent, and that the adoption of the Constitution did not change that fact.11
As a consequence, in Han the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment
barred lawsuits in federal court against a State by its own citizens, even
though the text only mentions citizens of other states and foreign countries.12
In recent years, the Court has built on Han to extend Eleventh Amendment
immunity to lawsuits in state courts,13 and before administrative agencies.14
This position remains the law today.
The primary alternative reading of the Eleventh Amendment, what
Calvin called the “revisionist” reading, was developed by a group of scholars
including Fletcher, Martha Field, Judge John Gibbons, and of course Akhil
Amar, in the decade prior to Calvin’s article.15 It argues, based on text and
history, that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to divest federal courts
only of diversity jurisdiction over cases between States and citizens of other
states or of foreign nations. It had no impact on jurisdiction under other

7
8
9

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 472–79 (opinion of Jay,

C.J.).
10
11
12
13
14
15

134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Id. at 14–16.
Id.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
See Massey, supra note 1, at 61–62 n.2 (summarizing scholarship).
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Article III heads, including notably federal question and admiralty
jurisdiction.16
Enter Calvin. It will not surprise you to learn that Calvin disagreed with
everybody. He disagreed with the Court (and its supporters) that the
Eleventh Amendment embodied any principle of sovereign immunity. Thus
he agreed with Fletcher, Amar et al. that Han was incorrectly decided17 (the
decisions I described extending Han post-date this debate, but I’m sure
Calvin found them dubious as well). On the other hand, he also did not buy
the “diversity” reading of the Eleventh Amendment because, as Calvin
correctly pointed out, this reading meant that state treasuries remained
vulnerable to lawsuits brought under federal law, including the Treaty of
Paris that protected British creditors as well as British and Loyalist
landowners from expropriation, a result the states surely would not have been
comfortable with.18 Instead, Calvin read the Eleventh Amendment literally,
as a party-based ouster of jurisdiction of the federal courts over all lawsuits
brought against states by citizens of other states and of foreign nations,
regardless of the subject matter of the lawsuit.19 It did not touch lawsuits by
citizens of the state being sued, because such suits were not really the
“problem” that the states faced (which was refusing to honor their debts and
legal obligations as against outsiders),20 and while the particular compromise
this created was not wholly logical, Calvin ably defended the view that the
Eleventh Amendment was in fact an unprincipled political compromise
between Federalists and Antifederalists21 (who were gradually morphing into
Democratic Republicans—but that is a different story).
What then of sovereign immunity? Calvin went on to argue that even
though the Eleventh Amendment has nothing to do with sovereign immunity,
some concept of state sovereign immunity almost certainly was implicit in
the concept of residual state sovereignty—a concept, he noted, which was
embodied (or perhaps reiterated) in the Tenth Amendment, not the Eleventh
(hence his title).22 This reading, however, has important consequences. First
and foremost, the Tenth Amendment recognizes residual state sovereignty
only to the extent that power has not been delegated to the national
government.23 That in turn means that when Congress does act pursuant to a
legitimately delegated power (such as the Commerce Clause), it may lift state
sovereign immunity, so long as it does so clearly.24 As it happens, precisely
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 148–49.
Id. at 114–15, 119, 149.
Id. at 65–66, 113–14.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 119–120.
Id. at 66, 143–44.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 144.

270

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 15, No. 2

this question (whether Congress could lift state sovereign immunity when
acting under the Commerce Clause) was pending at the Supreme Court when
Calvin wrote, in a case called Pennsylvania v. Union Gas (on which more
later),25 and Calvin’s views on that case were complex (again on which more
later).
Second, Calvin persuasively argued that whatever sovereign immunity
states enjoyed was a matter of state constitutional law, not federal law,
because state governments’ immunity had to derive from the sovereignty
delegated to them by their citizens.26 As Calvin pointed out, there were
profound differences even among the Framers on the proper scope of
sovereign immunity.27 Many people adhered to it, for reasons principled or
unprincipled—as the passage of the Eleventh Amendment indicated. On the
other hand, such eminent people as Attorney General Edmund Randolph, and
Associate Justice (and Framer) James Wilson, believed that the very concept
of sovereign immunity was incompatible with Republican forms of
government.28 So, positing a firmly held, universal view on this question
during the Framing era was absurd, making it more dubious to think that the
Constitution itself took an all-or-nothing approach to the question.
The ultimate implication of Calvin’s position was intriguing and
counterintuitive. It was that Congress could, pursuant to any of its
enumerated powers, authorize lawsuits against states by their own citizens.29
But (unlike Fletcher/Amar et al.), he concluded that it could NOT authorize
suits in federal court at all by citizens of other states or of foreign nations.30
Recognizing the unorthodox nature of his conclusions, Calvin’s article
examines the historical evidence exhaustively (hence the 400 plus footnotes),
from views on sovereign immunity during the Framing era, to the legal
disputes of the 1790s that triggered the Eleventh Amendment, to the
Amendment’s drafting history, to later treatments of the Eleventh
Amendment in the pre-Han era, notably by Chief Justice John Marshall, to
finally modern law (thus bringing in the fourth Marshall in our saga,
Thurgood). He also provided elegant arguments about why the Court’s
modern view must be wrong—for example, pointing out that the Eleventh
Amendment, by its terms, is a denial of jurisdiction to courts, yet under
modern law states can “waive” their Eleventh Amendment immunity. That
is entirely counter to the bedrock principle that jurisdictional barriers cannot
be waived by the parties.31 And so on—obviously I cannot here reiterate

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 147–50.
Id. at 94–96.
Id. at 87–97.
Id. at 101–02, 90–93, 97.
Id at 145.
Id.
Id. at 141–42.
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arguments spread across 91 pages of dense text, and I imagine you are
grateful that I don’t intend to try.
One of the notable aspects of the Massey/Fletcher debate was how much
they agreed upon. Both agreed that Han was wrong. Both agreed that views
on the scope of state sovereign immunity during the Framing era were
unsettled. And in their last exchange, both conceded that there will always
exist some uncertainty about the intended or best meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment, because the historical record is so sparse and confused.32 But,
they also of course disagreed.
So what happened? In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, the Court (by a
bizarre 4-1-4 vote) upheld Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to lift
state sovereign immunity,33 a result supported by Fletcher. Calvin’s position
was more subtle. He would have permitted this lawsuit in federal court if
Union Gas was a Pennsylvania citizen, but not if it was a citizen of another
state34—a fact which the Court ignored, because it only mattered under
Calvin’s approach. Regardless, seven years later in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida,35 the Court (with new membership) overruled Union Gas,
and adopted the position (still good law today) that Congress may not
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to its Article I powers36—
though it remains the law that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does
authorize such abrogation.37
So who was right, Calvin or Fletcher? Honestly, I have no idea. Unlike
Vik Amar and Evan Lee, I am no Federal Courts scholar, and I’ve avoided
the Eleventh Amendment avidly in my own scholarship. I don’t even teach it
in Constitutional Law. Both positions are plausible, and both have both
strengths and weaknesses. What I am confident about, however, is that
Calvin and Fletcher were both undoubtedly correct that Han v. Louisiana is
wrong. Yet almost thirty years after that debate, Han is still good law.
III.

CALVIN THE SCHOLAR

What are we to learn from this saga? First, how frustrating it is to be a
law professor, to be right, and to be ignored by the courts. But seriously, I
think this debate illustrates some very important points about Calvin’s
scholarship, and his broader intellectual legacy. The starting point, of course,
is the care, thoroughness, and extraordinary rigor that went into all of his
work. His 1989 article really is a prodigy—it struck me as such as a second
32
33
34
35
36
37

Massey et al., supra note 6, at 118, 121–22, 139.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989).
Massey, supra note 1, at 149–50.
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Id. at 57–73.
Id. at 65–66; Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003).
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year law student, and my view was reaffirmed when I reread the article this
past summer.
The other noteworthy aspect of this sequence of events was that despite
deep differences among the participants, they all treated one another with
extraordinary respect and courtesy, and freely conceded that the people they
disagreed with were not only not crazy, but indeed perfectly reasonable.
Calvin thanks Fletcher as a friend in his first author’s footnote.38 Fletcher’s
reply thanks Calvin and both Professors Marshall, naming them as friends.39
And in the final set of letters, everyone is willing to concede the strength of
some of the opposing arguments, and some of the potential weaknesses of
their position (though unsurprisingly no one retreated much). I believed in
1989–1990, and I continue to believe now, that this exchange provided a
model of how scholarly debate is supposed to proceed.
Finally, something distinctly Calvin. In the Eleventh Amendment
debate, the main positions have taken on a distinctly partisan aspect (as I
guess has almost everything else in constitutional law these days, and in our
society more broadly). “Liberals” favor the diversity thesis of Fletcher,
Amar et al. “Conservatives” stick to Han and broad state sovereign
immunity. Han remains the law, and indeed has been extended (and Union
Gas overruled) because of a series of close, 5-4 votes along ideological lines.
(As an aside, divides used to be ideological not partisan—Republican
appointees like Souter, Stevens and Blackmun might be “liberal,” while
Democratic appointees like White might be “conservative.” No longer.)
Likewise, views on these issues in the academy also tend to match partisan
preferences.
Not Calvin.
His argument rejecting the diversity thesis was
“conservative,” because it entirely forbade some federal question lawsuits in
federal court against the states. On the other hand, his position on
Congress’s power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in cases not within
the text of the Eleventh Amendment was “liberal,” because it empowered
Congress vis à vis state governments. This is typical. Calvin is one of the
very few constitutional scholars of whom I can honestly say that his
scholarship reveals essentially nothing about his politics. His view (I
remember him sharing it) was that scholarship was about thoroughness and
intellectual rigor. If that took you to a liberal place, so be it. If it took you to
a conservative place, so be it. Truth trumps politics. Calvin is sorely missed
for so many reasons—it is hard to recount them all. But in 2016 his rigor,
his rationality, and his commitment to the truth above all are in particularly
short supply, and are particularly missed.

38
39

Massey, supra note 1, at 61 n.†.
Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1261 n.†.

